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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
This Petition for Review by Appellant is from a final order of the Labor 
Commission of Utah dated July 16, 2003, Order Denying Motion for 
Reconsideration, and encompasses the Labor Commission's Order Denying 
Motion for Review, dated May 1, 2003. This Court has jurisdiction over this 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §§ 34A-2-801(8)(a), 63-46b-16, and 
78-2a-3(2)(a). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Issue: Whether the Commission properly found that Ms. Giles failed 
to meet her burden of establishing, by a preponderance of evidence, that she 
is entitled to worker's compensation benefits under the applicable 
Occupational Disease Act as a result of her work with TAD during the period 
of September 1985 to October 1990. This issue was preserved at R. 345-70 
and throughout record. 
Standard of Review: This matter involves the Commission's 
determination of medical causation which is an issue of fact which appellate 
courts will review under the "substantial evidence standard". See Chase v. 
Industrial Common. 872 P.2d 475 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); Utah Code Ann. 
§§63-46b-16(4)(g) (2004). Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence 
1 
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion/' 
The appellate court will sustain the Commission's factual determination 
concerning medical causation only if its finding is adequately supported by 
the record. See id. 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
The relevant statute at issue in Ms. Giles' claim against TAD is the 
1990 version of the Last Employer Liable Rule, Utah Code Ann. § 35-2-14 
(1990) which provides in relevant part: 
Where compensation is payable for an occupational disease the only 
employer liable shall be the employer in whose employment the 
employee was last injuriously exposed to the hazards of such disease 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-2-14 (1990).l 
1
 Unlike the general rule in Utah - where court's apply the substantive 
law in effect when the action was initiated (i.e., the date the claim was filed), 
- the proper law to be applied in workers' compensation matters is the law 
"as it existed at the time of the injury." Marshall v. Industrial Comm'n, 704 
P.2d 581 (Utah 1985); Smith v. Mitv Lite, 939 P.2d 684, n . l (Utah Ct. App. 
1997) (courts must apply "the law at the time of the initial injury"). 
Although Utah's appellate courts have not specifically articulated this rule 
in the context of occupational diseases, the same premise should apply. 
That is, in occupational disease claims, the Commission must apply the law 
in effect when the worker was injured, or in occupational disease terms, 
when the worker suffered an "injurious exposure" to the disease-causing 
agent(s). 
For Ms. Giles to successfully prevail against TAD, she must show an 
injurious exposure during the course of her employment with TAD 
Accordingly, she must show that her injurious exposure occurred sometime 
between September 1985 and October 1990, the dates during which she 
2 
Moreover, Utah Code Ann. § 35-2-27 (1990), defines the requirement 
for proof of an occupational diseases as follows: 
For the purpose of this act only the diseases enumerated in this 
section shall be deemed to be occupational diseases: 
(28) Such other diseases or injuries to health which 
directly arise as a natural incident of the exposure occasioned 
by the employment, provided however, that such a disease or 
injury to health shall be compensable only in those instances 
where it is shown by the employee or his dependents that all of 
the follow named circumstances were present: (1) a direct 
causal connection between the conditions under which the work 
is performed and the disease or injury to health; (2) the disease 
or injury to health can be seen to have followed as a natural 
incident fo the work as a result of the exposure occasioned by 
the employment; (3) the disease or injury to health can be fairly 
traced to the employment as to the proximate cause; (4) the 
disease or injury to health is not of a character to which the 
employee may have had substantial exposure outside of the 
employment; (5) the disease or injury to health is incidental to 
the character fo the business and not independent of the 
relation of the employer and employee; and (6) the disease or 
injury to health must appear to have had its origin in a risk 
connected with the employment and to have flowed from that 
source as a natural consequence, though it need not have been 
foreseen or expected before discovery. No disease or injury to 
health shall be found compensable where it is of a character to 
which the general public is commonly exposed. 
Id. 
was employed by TAD. Since she was not employed with in 1991, that 
statute does not apply in her claims against TAD. 
3 
The ALJ's Order incorrectly lists the 1991 version of this statute.2 See 
R., 343. 
With regard to medical causation, Utah's appellate courts have also 
stated that a "claimant must show by evidence, opinion, or otherwise that 
the stress, strain or exertion required by his or her occupation led to the 
resulting injury or disability." Allen v. Industrial Comm'n. 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 
1986). 
2
 The ALJ incorrectly referenced Utah Code Ann. §35-2-107 (1991) in 
his analysis which provides: 
For purposes of this chapter, a compensable occupational 
disease is defined as any disease or illness which arises out of 
and in the course of employment and is medically caused or 
aggravated by employment. 
Id. However, the application of the 1991 version of this statute is harmless 
error since, by its terms, this statute requires an injured worker to show 
substantially less by way of her burden of proof. 
4 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This case presents a question of whether Ms. Giles is entitled to 
worker's compensation benefits from various defendants, in particular, TAD 
Technical Services Corporation and its workers' compensation carrier, 
Liberty Mutual Insurance. She files an appeal from the Utah Labor 
Commission's Order Denying Motion for Review and Order Denying Motion 
for Reconsideration. 
Course of the Proceedings 
With respect to the legal proceedings Ms. Giles has filed against TAD 
Technical Services Corporation (also known as "Adecco") and/or Liberty 
Mutual Insurance Company, the following course of events have ensued: 
On December 27, 2000 Ms. Giles filed an Application for Hearing 
seeking worker's compensation benefits from Oakridge Country Club and 
the Worker's Compensation Fund. See R., 96-117. Ms. Giles claimed 
"chemically induced porphyria" as a result of exposure to "numerous toxic 
fumes and materials" during the course of her employment with this 
employer from May 1991 to December 1991.3 See R., 98. 
3
 A prior action was filed on May 30, 1992 against Oakridge Country 
Club and/or the Worker's Compensation Fund for exposure to chlorine gas 
on September 7, 1991. See R., 1-95. That case, Case No. 92-693 resulted 
in a resolution by way of settlement agreement. 
5 
On that same date, Ms. Giles filed a motion with the Labor 
Commission requesting that an administrative law judge with no ties to the 
Labor Commission be assigned to hear this occupational disease case. See 
R., 96. Her request stemmed from her belief that a Commission ALJ would 
not fairly adjudicate her claim due to a previous result she obtained in her 
prior workers' compensation case. 
On February 22, 2001, Administrative Law Judge Richard LaJeunesse 
denied her motion. Judge La Jeunesse stated: "The Labor Commission is 
the only agency that has jurisdiction to hear workers compensation cases. 
Therefore, it is not possible to even entertain your request that a judge 
outside the Labor Commission hear your case." See R., 121. 
In a letter dated March 8, 2001 Ms. Giles requested joinder of TAD 
and its insurer, Liberty Mutual Insurance, to this occupational disease 
claim. (Collectively, "TAD"). See R., 133. She did so in an attempt to 
obtain possible apportionment attributable to TAD under what she believed 
was the applicable statute - Utah Code Ann. § 35-2-105 (1991).4 
On May 14, 2001, the Labor Commission sent an Amended Request 
for Answer to TAD and Liberty Mutual. See R., 195. On June 8, 2001 TAD 
filed an Answer and a Motion for Summary Judgment. See R., 340-70. In 
4
 As noted infra, the applicable statute appropriate to her claim 
against TAD is Utah Code Ann. § 35-2-14 (1990). 
6 
the Motion for Summary Judgment TAD asserted: (1) Ms. Giles failed to 
meet certain statute of limitation requirements with respect to the filing of 
her claim; (2) Ms. Giles claim fails for lack of medical evidence to support 
her claim against TAD; and, (3) the last injurious exposure rule of section 
35-2-14(1990) bars all liability against TAD. See id. Thereafter, Ms. Giles 
filed a response. See R., 375-85. 
In a letter dated March 8, 2001, Ms. Giles submitted a request for 
reconsideration of the ALJ's denial of an independent ALJ to hear her case. 
See R., 129. On June 11, 2001, the Labor Commission issued an Order 
Denying Reconsideration of an independent ALJ. See R., 373. On July 13, 
2001, Petitioner filed a Petition for Review with the Utah Court of Appeals. 
See R.. 416-17. 
On July 18, 2001, TAD filed a reply memorandum in support of its 
motion for summary judgment. R., 421-34. 
On July 23, 2001, TAD filed a Motion for Summary Dismissal with the 
Utah Court of Appeals. See R., 450-76. The Court of Appeals issued a 
decision on December 6, 2001 ruling that because there was no final order, 
Ms. Giles' appeal was barred for lack of jurisdiction. See R., 686-87. Her 
petition for certiorari with the Utah Supreme Court was denied. See R., 702. 
7 
On June 6, 2002, Administrative Law Judge La Jeunesse issued his 
Ruling on Motions for Summary Judgment and Motions to Dismiss (the 
"Order"). See R., 720-35. In the Order, the ALJ granted TAD's summary 
judgment motion, ruling that Ms. Giles failed in her burden of establishing 
medical causation. The ALJ's Order did not address the other grounds 
raised in TAD's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
On July 8, 2002, Ms. Giles filed a Motion for Review. TAD filed a 
response on July 25, 2002. See R., 851-68. On August 30, 2002, Ms. 
Giles filed an additional Memorandum in Support of the Motion for Review. 
See R., 884. 
On May 1, 2003 the Commission entered its Order Denying Motion for 
Review. See R., 1030-36. The Commission affirmed the ALJ's position with 
regard to TAD's liability, ruling that Ms. Giles was unable to produce 
evidence that her work at TAD exposed her to chemicals that caused or 
contributed to her porphyria. 
On May 21, 2003, Ms. Giles filed a Request for Reconsideration. See 
R., 1037-1120. TAD filed a response to this motion on June 3, 2003. See 
R., 1129-38. Petitioner filed her response on June 16, 2003. See R., 1149-
69. On July 16, 2003 the Commission entered its Order Denying Request 
for Reconsideration. See R., 1231-35. 
8 
On July 16, 2003 Ms. Giles filed a Petition for Review. See R., 1236-
37. She filed an Amended Petition for Review on July 23, 2003. See R., 
1239-40. 
On August 7, 2003 Ms. Giles filed a Docketing Statement. 
On August 27, 2003 Ms. Giles filed a Motion to Direct the Labor 
Commission to Supplement the Record Index and Motion to Stay the Filing 
Deadline for Appellant's Brief Until the Record is Complete5. On September 
26, 2003 the Utah Court of Appeals issued an Order on this motion. 
On November 6, 2003, the Utah Labor Commission entered a Briefing 
Order. 
On November 21, 2003 Ms. Giles filed a Memorandum Regarding 
Supplementation of the Record. On December 2, 2003 TAD filed a response 
to this motion. 
On February 19, 2004 the Commission issued its Determination 
Regarding Giles' Request to Supplement Record. 
On March 3, 2004 Ms. Giles filed a Motion Requesting Court of 
Appeals to Review the Labor Commissions Determination Regarding Record 
and Motion to Stay the Filing Deadline for Appellant's Brief Until Review is 
Completed and Issues Regarding Record are Resolved. TAD filed a response 
5Citations to the record are not available for these ensuing events. 
9 
to this motion on March 8, 2004. Ms. Giles filed a reply on March 18, 2004. 
On March 22, 2004, the Court of Appeals issued its Order denying Ms. Giles 
motion and set a 30-day appellate briefing schedule for April 22, 2004.6 
Ms. Giles' brief was submitted to the Court of Appeals on May 21, 
2004. 
Statement of Facts 
Ms. Giles worked as a secretary for TAD from September 1985 to 
October of 1990. See R., 354. She believes that during this employment 
she was exposed to multiple toxic fumes and substances contributing to her 
porphyria. She cannot recall with any certainty the substances to which 
she might have been exposed, the length of exposure, or the quantity of 
exposure. 
Ms. Giles next began working for Oakridge Country Club beginning 
around June 1, 1991 to December 19 th of that year. 
On about June 9, 1992 Ms. Giles filed an Application for Hearing 
claiming injury on September 7, 1991 at Oakridge which she described as 
"chlorine gas exposure." See R., 1-95. A hearing on that case was held on 
January 4, 1993. See R., 36. The ALJ ruled that Ms. Giles did not meet 
6
 Ms. Giles has filed a plethora of other motions which are not 
referenced in this brief as TAD does not believe they are relevant for 
purposes of this appeal. 
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her burden of proof and denied her claim. See id. Petitioner filed a Motion 
for Review and Motion for Reconsideration which were both denied. See R., 
50-54. She sought review with the Utah Court of Appeals. 
In the meantime, Ms. Giles continued to seek a medical diagnosis of 
her alleged condition. On January 5, 1995 Dr. Baker diagnosed her injury 
as "chemically acquired or chemically induced porphyria" from exposure to 
toxic fumes at Oakridge. See R., 367-69. Dr. Baker described this 
condition as follows: 
The porphyrias are a group of diseases of heme synthesis 
in which the over production of prophyrian compounds result 
from deficient enzyme activity in the biosynthetic pathway of 
heme... 
Without attempting to separately describe each different 
porphyria, general symptoms of the acute attack may include 
abdominal pain... nausea, vomiting,...diarrhea. Neurological 
symptoms... may include peripheral neuropathy, weakness, ... 
sensory disorder, possible respiratory problems, hallucinations, 
confusion, depression, sometimes even seizures. 
In summary, then, Glenda Giles has developed porphyria 
as a result of exposure to toxic materials at work at a country 
club. In addition to be (sic) exposed to chlorine, she was 
exposed to extensive materials in remodeling including 
carpeting. She did notice in this area and she consistently 
better away from this area. 
Tests at the Mayo clinic do indicate that she does have 
porphyria. It is highly unlikely that she had this previously as 
she does have a triple enzyme defect, and the hereditary forms 
of porphyria usually will have one enzyme defect. 
11 
R., 367-69. 
Oakridge continued to dispute liability; however, a compromise 
settlement was eventually reached and was approved by the Labor 
Commission. Under this settlement, Ms. Giles is entitled to receive lifetime 
benefits from the Employers' Reinsurance Fund ("ERF") based upon her 
claim of being permanently and totally disabled as a result of her claimed 
exposure on September 7, 1991. See R., 360. 
On December 27, 2000 Ms. Giles filed a second Application for 
Hearing, the present action, seeking worker's compensation benefits from 
Oakridge Country Club and the Worker's Compensation Fund. See R., 98. 
This second action was based on the same condition, porphyria, that served 
as the basis of her first claim under the Workers' Compensation Act. Ms. 
Giles has claimed to have contracted "chemically induced porphyria" as a 
result of exposure to "numerous toxic fumes and materials" during the 
course of her employ with this employer from May 1991 to December 1991. 
See id. Despite the fact that she is already receiving permanent total 
disability benefits from ERF, Ms. Giles is claiming that she is, somehow, 
entitled to yet additional permanent total disability benefits as a result of 
her claimed porphyria. 
12 
Ms. Giles requested joinder of TAD and its insurer, Liberty Mutual 
Insurance, to this occupational disease claim; however, Ms. Giles did not 
submit any evidence of exposure to substances at TAD that caused or 
contributed to her porphyria. See R., 133. 
Ms. Giles also requested the Labor Commission to assign an ALJ to 
her case who was independent of any Labor Commission ties. See R., 96. 
That request was denied by the ALJ, and later affirmed by the Commission. 
Although she appealed this matter to the Utah Court of Appeals, that review 
was denied given the lack of a final order. 
Ms. Giles' case against TAD was eventually decided by way of 
Summary Judgment by Administrative Law Judge La Jeunesse. The ALJ 
ruled that because Ms. Giles did not meet her burden of medical causation, 
she had failed to meet her burden of proof. The ALJ ruled: 
Ms. Giles admitted that the identity and nature of her 
exposure to any porphyric substances while employed at Adecco 
remained conjectural as to the nature, type, time, and place of 
any such exposure. At best, Ms. Giles can only express her 
belief as to the type of substance her employment at Adecco 
exposed her to, and admitted the impossibility of identifying 
with any certainty the presumed toxic materials or any details 
concerning the alleged exposures. Ms. Giles also conceded that 
[she] did not know to what extent her exposures while employed 
by Adecco affected, contributed, predisposed, and/or caused 
her porphyria. 
Ms. Giles admitted that her principal case was against 
Oakridge, but she joined Adecco as a hedge against 
13 
apportionment under the Occupational Disease statute. Ms. 
Giles essentially conceded that proof of the claim fell beyond her 
means and left it to the Labor Commission to deal with 
apportionment if relevant. Since Ms. Giles lacked a means to 
prove by preponderance of the evidence that her porphyria 
arose out of and in the course of her employment with Adecco, 
her claim must be dismissed. 
R., 720-35. 
The Commission affirmed the ALJ's ruling on the same grounds. The 
issue of medical causation being dispositive, neither the ALJ nor the 
Commission ruled on the other grounds for dismissal raised in TAD's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. See R., 1030-36. 
Ms. Giles has consistently reiterated that she does not know all of the 
chemicals and fumes to which she might have been exposed while in TAD's 
employ. Ms. Giles has speculated as to such substances in her Response 
to Memorandum in Support of Respondent Adecco's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, but has stated that she cannot recall the substances to which 
she might have been exposed at TAD, the length of exposure, the dates of 
exposure, the quantity of fumes to which she might have been exposed, the 
source of each fume, and the identity of the toxic materials. 
14 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Because Ms. Giles claims exposure to toxic substances in the course 
of employment with TAD which employment ended in 1990, the 1990 
version of Utah law applies in this case. Under the applicable statute, Utah 
Code Ann. § 35-2-14 (1990), no apportionment is allowed against TAD since 
Oakridge was the last employer during the period of last injurious exposure. 
However, as the Commission correctly ruled in its Order Denying 
Motion for Review, Ms. Giles has not submitted any medical evidence 
showing exposure to toxic substances during the course of her employment 
with TAD. Indeed, she has admitted in several instances that she cannot 
recall the times, or places, or even the names of the substances to which 
she was allegedly exposed. Certainly, no employer can defend itself from 
such a vague and unsubstantiated claim. Thus, the Commission correctly 
denied her claim against TAD for lack of medical causation. 
15 
ARGUMENT7 
MS. GILES FAILED TO MEET HER BURDEN OF PROVING 
MEDICAL CAUSATION 
Ms. Giles submits that the Commission incorrectly granted TAD's 
Motion for Summary Judgment.8 Her brief provides little by way of actual 
argument to substantiate this point. Nonetheless, TAD asserts that the ALJ 
and the Commission correctly denied benefits to Ms. Giles for her alleged 
occupational disease against TAD given her failure to submit medical 
evidence attributing her porphyria to her employment with TAD. 
The Commission began its analysis by stating the correct legal 
standard: summary judgment may be granted only when no genuine issues 
7TAD addresses only those legally relevant and factually supported 
issues that directly pertain to the appeal against TAD. 
Ms. Giles also makes allegations of bias against the ALJ, the 
Commission and the adjudication process. These assertions are simply 
unfounded and not supported by substantial evidence. In any event, she 
has failed to marshall the evidence on this matter, and on most issues 
raised in her brief, as required by law. 
8
 She spends much time in point IV of her brief asserting why TAD's 
Motion for Summary Judgment was not correctly considered under 12(b) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. However, section 63-46b-l(4)(b) states 
that the court may grant a timely motion to dismiss or for summary 
judgment if the requirements of Rule 12(b) or Rule 56, respectively of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, are met. Given that TAD filed a Motion for 
Summary Judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, there was no need for the court to consider Rule 12(b), and the 
defenses raised in that rule, as a basis for its ruling. 
16 
of material fact exist and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56; Utah Code Ann. 63-46b-l(4); Harper v. Summit 
County, 963 P.2d 768 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). The Commission and ALJ both 
agreed, as does TAD, that even when considered in a light most favorable 
to Ms. Giles, Ms. Giles has failed to establish a genuine issue of material 
fact regarding TAD's liability in this matter. She provides no challenge to 
this point on appeal. 
Turning to whether TAD was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, 
the ALJ and Commission both ruled that Ms. Giles did not submit any 
evidence with her Application for Hearing to establish, by a preponderance 
of evidence, that her work at TAD during the stated period exposed her to 
chemicals that medically caused or contributed to her diagnosed porphyria. 
The ALJ stated on this point: 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-2-107 (1991) provided that: 
For purposes of this chapter, a compensable occupational 
disease is defined as any disease or illness which arises out of and in 
the course of employment and is medically caused or aggravated by 
that employment. 
Ms. Giles as the petitioner in the present matter carried 
the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that her 
porphyria arose out of and in the course of her employment with 
Adecco. [see gen: Ashcroft v. The Industrial Commission of 
Utah, 855 P.2d 267, 269 (Ut App. 1993) (petitioner's burden of 
proof by preponderance of the evidence)]. Ms. Giles also bore 
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the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that her 
employment at Adecco medically caused her porphyria. 
The medical evidence produced by Ms. Giles to date in this 
case, and taken in the light most favorable to Ms. Giles, 
established that she developed porphyria as a result of exposure 
to toxic materials while at work for Oakridge and not from any 
prior industrial exposure. Accordingly, Ms. Giles' own medical 
evidence excluded Adecco from any liability for Ms. Giles' 
porphyria, [see gen: Stevenson v. The Industrial Commission of 
Utah* 641 P.2d 117 (Utah 1982). 
Ms. Giles admitted that the identity and nature of her 
exposure to any porphyric substances while employed at Adecco 
remained conjectural as to the nature, type, time, and place of 
any such exposure. At best, Ms. Giles can only express her 
belief as to the type of substance her employment at Adecco 
exposed her to, and admitted the impossibility of identifying 
with any certainty the presumed toxic materials or any details 
concerning the alleged exposures. Ms. Giles also conceded that 
[she] did not know to what extend her exposures while employed 
by Adecco affected, contributed, predisposed, and/or caused 
her porphyria. 
Ms. Giles admitted that her principal case [was] against 
Oakridge, but she joined Adecco as a hedge against 
apportionment under the Occupational Disease statute. Ms. 
Giles essentially conceded that proof of the claim fell beyond her 
means and left it to the Labor Commission to deal with 
apportionment if relevant. Since Ms. Giles lacked a means to 
prove by preponderance of the evidence that her porphyria 
arose out of and in the course of her employment with Adecco 
her claim must be dismissed. 
R., 733. 
Although the ALJ incorrectly referenced Utah Code Ann. § 35-2-107 
(1991) as the applicable statute, rather than Utah. Code Ann. § 35-2-27(28) 
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(1990), that reference is essentially harmless error since the ALJ and 
Commission found that even under this more lenient statute, the claimant 
failed in her burden of medical causation. Certainly, if the Commission and 
ALJ had properly applied Utah Code Ann. § 35-2-27(28) (1990) to this case, 
Ms. Giles would have been required to show not only that the claimed 
disease arose as a natural incident to exposure occasioned by employment 
(i.e., the medical causation standard),9 but also, the following six 
requirements: 
(1) a direct causal connection between the conditions under which 
the work is performed and the disease or injury to health; 
(2) the disease or injury to health can be seen to have followed as 
a natural incident of the work as a result of the exposure 
occasioned by the employment; 
(3) the disease or injury to health can be fairly traced to the 
employment as to the proximate cause; 
(4) the disease or injury to health is not of a character to which the 
employee may have had substantial exposure outside of the 
employment; 
(5) the disease or injury to health is incidental to the character of 
the business and not independent of the relation of the 
employer and employee; and 
9
 This is akin to the arising out of and in the course of employment 
requirement found in the 1991 statute and its successors. Historically, 
and presently, the arising out of and in the course of employment 
requirement in the Workers' Compensation and Occupational Disease Acts 
encompass the elements of medical and legal causation. 
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(6) the disease or injury to health must appear to have had its 
origin in a risk connected with the employment and to have 
flowed from that source as a natural consequence, though it 
need not have been foreseen or expected before discovery. 
Utah Code Ann. §35-2-27(28) (1990). 
Utah's appellate courts have interpreting the arising out of 
requirement in this statute and its successors, to require proof of medical 
causation. This requires that a "claimant . . . show by evidence, opinion, 
or otherwise that the stress, strain or exertion required by his or her 
occupation led to the resulting injury or disability." Allen v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986). Absent such evidence, the claimant's 
case fails. 
Ms. Giles has not met the necessary statutory and case law 
requirements to establish a medical causal connection between her 
porphyria and her work at TAD. The evidence in this case reveals that Ms. 
Giles' claimed porphyria resulted from, if anything, her exposure to 
substances at Oakridge Country Club - for which she is already receiving 
permanent total disability benefits.10 On January 5, 1995, Dr. Gordon 
Baker indicated that Petitioner "was in good health until she began working 
10In this regard, Respondents herein submit that Ms. Giles cannot be 
more permanently and totally disabled as a result of her present condition. 
Rather, she can claim entitlement only once to permanent total disability 
benefits. 
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at the Oakridge Country Club." See R., xxi i ^ . ^ . Baker also indicated 
that "Glenda Giles has developed porphyria as a result of exposure to '• ,>xic 
f
 work at a country clu b." ..••.c^ ic*. i >ti.kcv states that: 
Tests al the Mayo Clinic do indicate she does have porph^ i ia. 
It is highly unlikely that she had this previously as she does 
have a triple enzyme defect, and the hereditary forms of 
porphyria will have one enzyme defect. 
Id, 
]\/] • - - : : \ -M • ..: - ,, :\ ... •, L a n y 
evidence oi exposure tu *. • " ' • <'•"*• e 
en ploved h\ TAb. Rather, the evidence she presented supports the 
position triai *AC was exposed t~ noxious chemicals in September 1991. 
b i c e.g. • : i} vas employed l)v Oakndge 
Country Club. 
Additionally, Ms. Giles explicitly stated on several occasions that she 
has no evidence showing exposure to toxic substances during the course of 
1,11
 "' 'Mnploymrnt ,tl I 'il1 I" h'1" irspouses ',' I \l)i. InLei rogatories she 
stated as followrs: 
21. Please identify each ,m." even' toxic fume \ou :laim you 
were exposed \o during your employment with Adeeco. . . 
:: icse exposures occurrv-u ji< *,a to sixteen years ci&u, and 
it is impossible for Petitioner, at this late date, to compile 
a list of each exposure; on what dates or dates they 
occurred; the length of time of exposure; the quantity of 
fume exposed to; the source or sources of each fume; and, 
the precise location of each exposure to such fume. 
Petitioner was exposed to toxic fumes on a daily basis, but 
has no way of knowing the identity of all the toxic 
materials she was exposed to. . . . Petitioner did not work 
with any of the toxic substances. 
R., at 433 (Emphasis added.). She has affirmed this position similarly in 
other pleadings to the Labor Commission. See, e.g. R., 375-85, 398-08. 
Because Petitioner has failed to submit any evidence to support her 
claim against TAD, she has not met her burden of proof. Accordingly, these 
Respondents request this court to affirm the Commission's ruling and 
dismiss her claim with prejudice.11 
H i xIn any event, even if Ms. Giles could meet her burden of medical 
causation against TAD, because §35-2-14 (1990) does not permit 
apportionment against former employers, TAD has no liability in this 
instance. 
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CONCLUSION 
"li Commission's Order Denying Motion for Review was properly 
entered - 4~u:^ - n s r N-^ t ~~UT H-~- "-"he applicable la w disallow 
burden to show UICLL iiei porphyria i iiirdimH' m ninrctn I I hor 
employment with TAD, 
Respectfully submitted this / 6 ; ^ u n e , 2004. 
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